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Abstract
Indonesia's natural forest has been persistently declining, even with the fastest rate in the world, regardless of 
various efforts to stop the decline or at least to reduce the rate significantly. At the same time, development of 
plantation forest has been very slow. Amongst the various causes of the natural forest loss that have been identified, 
financial nonprofitability was not one of them. That being said, the fundamental reason as to why utilization of 
natural forest for timber production will not survive in the long run is because of financial nonprofitability.   In order 
for a business to stay in the industry of the natural forest utilization, the government should provide financial 
incentives using public's money. Hence, the public support for the forestry is vital for the survival of the industry?. 
However, improper implementation of forestry laws can have damaging impacts to the public's perception and 
support. Moreover, the five policies, namely forest land establishment, fees and royalties, log export ban, 
certification, and forest management unit establishment, which have failed to deliver sustainable natural production 
forests, are shortly discussed. Finally, the more appropriate approach of natural forest utilization is basically not as a 
sustainable forest management but rather as the optimal timber mining, which consequently requires different set of 
policies.  
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Introduction
According to the constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia, natural resources are controlled by the state and 
used for the greatest prosperity of the people. The 
constitution also mandates that the national economy is 
performed on the basis of economic democracy with the 
principles of togetherness, just efficiency, sustainability, 
environmental consideration, independence, and with 
maintaining balance of development and national economy 
unity. These are the foundations of political economy of 
forestry and other sectors in Indonesia. Those principles 
should be operationalized through law, government 
regulations, and ministerial decree. The first political 
economic question regarding forestry is who should produce 
forest-based goods and services? To what extent should the 
government involved in the production process of forest-
based goods and services?
The picture of forestry in Indonesia is characterized by 
two symptoms; they are a persistent degradation of the 
natural forests and a slow expansion of the plantation forests. 
Further discussion focuses more on the natural forests. 
Various causes of the forest loss have been identified, which 
include social, economic, and institutional factors (Repetto 
& Gillis 1988; Angelsen & Kaimowitz 1999; Goers . et al
2012). Although the proposed recommendations might not 
be effective in halting the deforestation, some 
recommendations have the potential for enhancing 
government revenue, making the timber harvest more 
efficient, and promoting the development of plantation 
forest. Moreover, the loss of natural forests would have been 
offset by the expansion of plantation forest. Unfortunately, 
what we have seen is that the loss of natural forests takes 
place persistently while the plantation forest expands 
sluggishly.
The fundamental reason as to why the allocation of 
natural forests for timber production purposes will not 
survive in the long run is because of financial 
nonprofitability.  There are two main factors contributing to 
this situation, i.e. the growth rate of natural forest is very low 
and the increase in timber price, or more precisely in 
stumpage price, over time is also very low. Those two factors 
are essential for selecting the optimal standing stock to 
maximize the discounted perpetual profit; in general, given 
the increase in the stumpage price, the higher the discount 
rate the lower the standing stock. As a matter of fact, the 
utilization of natural forests is profitable only in the first 
rotation when the forests still contain a huge amount of 
timber. In other words, the more appropriate approach to 
natural forest utilization is basically not as a sustainable 
forest management but rather as the optimal timber mining, 
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which consequently requires different set of policies. So, it is 
not surprising when Clark (1973b) suggests that a total 
liquidation of the entire population may appear as the most 
attractive. Using a different approach, Hyde (2005) has 
questioned the sustainability of natural forest management as 
it has been traditionally thought by foresters.
Having recognized the nonsustainability of natural forest 
utilization, the government needs to issue appropriate 
policies, for example, how to optimize timber extraction to 
maximize the government revenue. In this regard, Repetto 
and Gillis (1988) outline very nicely how the government 
policies, both forestry policies and those impinging on the 
forestry sector, have resulted in economic and fiscal losses 
while they have contributed to the degradation of forest 
resources. However, instead of addressing the critical issues, 
such as property rights, appropriate fiscal policy, incentive 
system, and inefficient timber processing industry, the 
government has dedicated its time with improper issues, such 
as certification.
The purpose of this article is to show that utilization of 
the natural forests in Indonesia is not sustainable since it is 
hardly or not profitable in the long term. As depicted in 
, the trend of the business of natural forest utilization. Table 1
declines persistently. Of 265 business units recorded in 2016, 
only 199 units are actively running their business. Following 
this introduction, the Section 3 discusses necessary 
conditions for sustainability, covering the price, the growth 
rate of standing stock, and property rights. Section 4 is a 
discussion of the policies that have failed to deliver the 
outcome expected. Finally, Section 5 is conclusion .)
Methods
This paper is basically a synthesis of the literature and the 
experience gained from years of interaction with various 
relevant parties, such as government officials, entrepreneurs, 
academics, forest communities, and non-governmental 
organizations. In essence, it is a participant observation 
supported by theoretical and empirical findings. Some 
literature provides a theoretical review of the necessary 
conditions that must be met for the maximum benefit in the 
long term. Businesses that are not profitable will not be able 
to survive in the long term. The results of theoretical reviews 
are then faced with the realities that are obtained from the 
literatures that are more empirical. Often it is very difficult to 
obtain data required to verify the theoretical results. In this 
situation, consulting forest practitioners becomes a way out. 
If this is the case, then information obtained and the party 
consulted will be provided. My colleague asked me if I 
employed the bricolage approach in writing this article. 
When I was asked I had not heard the term bricolage. Having 
read a few materials regarding the bricolage, I do not mind if 
the approach I am using is essentially a bricolage, even 
though I do not make any claim. Bricolage is an approach to 
qualitative inquiry. The bricolage allows researchers to 
embrace flexibility and plurality by amalgamating multiple 
disciplines, multiple methodologies, and varying theoretical 
perspectives (Rogers 2012).
 The political economy outlined in the constitution is 
translated into more operational policies.  These more 
operational policies are the real form of political economy. 
Furthermore, the success and failure of a policy of political 
economy can be seen from a variety of ways and discipline. 
Testing the success of the political economy of forestry in 
Indonesia should include aspects of social welfare, 
sustainability, environment, and justice. In this context, 
bricolage is best suited for use as an analytical approach. 
Even though this paper is more toward policy evaluation 
rather than policy analysis, they share with each other in 
multiple tools employed (Knoepfel et al. 2007). The core 
theories employed as a framework in this paper essentially 
include economics of renewable natural resource utilization, 
institutional economics, and administrative theory. Who 
benefits and loses from each policy is identified.
Necessary conditions for sustainability Sustainability 
of renewable natural resource management is determined by 
biological, economic, and institutional factors (Piazza & Roy 
2015). The biological factors include growth rate and size of 
the renewable natural resource. The economic factors 
include discount rate, price level, and rate of the price 
change. The institutional factor refers to rule of the game 
under which the natural resource management is executed; 
however, in this paper only property right regime will be 
discussed. If one of those factors is not satisfied, then it is 
sufficient to say that the natural resource management will 
not be sustainable.
Price: Level and change The role of the price level and the  
price change can be seen easily in a dynamic optimization 
choosing the optimal extraction rate and optimal stock level 
of the renewable natural resource to maximize the 
discounted perpetual net benefit flow (Clark 1973b; 1979; 
Levhari et al. 1981; Cropper 1988; Swanson 1994; 
Ackerman 1994; Brown 2000; Mitra & Roy 2006). Thefirst 
condition says that the price of the harvested timber must 
equal the user cost-in forestry it is well known as stumpage 
price-plus the marginal cost. This condition is required to 
ensure the profit of a natural resource management is being 
  
 
Table 1 Business of natural forest utilization
Year  Number of company  Official area (ha)  Effective area (ha)  
1992  580  61.38  42.97  
2000
 
362
 
39.16
 
27.41
 
2005
 
285
 
27.72
 
19.40
 
2010
 
304
 
24.95
 
17.46
 2015
 
269
 
20.62
 
14.43
 2016
 
265
 
20.88
 
14.62
 Source: APHI (Indonesian Forest Business Association) provided through personal communication with Mr. Herman Prayudi, Deputy of 
Executive Director, in August 2017
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maximized; the lower the price, the lower the profit. 
However, it is possible that the price is too low so that there is 
no harvest rate that satisfies the condition. Furthermore, in 
this case the resource will not be exploited and hence it will 
never go extinct (Clark 1973b). However, if a renewable 
natural resource is not profitable, then it will potentially be 
excluded from the human portfolio asset. Exclusion from the 
human portfolio of biological assets is a sufficient condition 
for biological extinction via conversion (Swanson 1994).
 Based on data on the current prices of meranti sawlogs 
released by ITTO from 1998 2016, the average growth rate -
of the price is 8.9% annually. During the same period, the 
inflation rate, based on the data on the GDP deflator 
published by the World Bank, is 10.7%. Hence, the real price 
of meranti sawlogs declines by 1.8% during 1998 2016.-
 The log export ban has been heavily distorting the 
domestic log prices. In the mid of 1997, for example, the 
-3
average price of meranti groups was USD112.5 m  in the 
-3
domestic market, while it was USD200.0 235.0 m  in the -
international market. Furthermore, the international price of 
-3
sawn timber was USD1.500 m , while the domestic price 
-3
was only USD600 m . It has been expected that the sawn 
timber is allowed to be exported, but unfortunately the export 
of logs and sawn timber is still banned. The gap between the 
price of round wood in the international and domestic 
markets failed to contract and the rent were not collected 
properly by the government but accumulated unexpectedly 
in the hands of players in the black market for round wood 
(Kato 2005).
Growth rate of standing stock The second condition 
requires that the growth rate of the renewable natural 
resource plus the change in the user cost is equal to the 
discount rate. The growth rate of the renewable natural 
resource is dependent on the stock level of the resource. 
Moreover, the manager of the natural resource attempts to 
find out the stock level of the resource that satisfies this 
second condition; the higher the discount rate, the lower the 
stock level of the natural resource. In other words, a higher 
discount rate generally associates with rapid extraction. For 
economically valuable renewable natural resource that 
possesses low reproductive capacities, profit maximization 
may lead to the extinction of the resource (Clark 1973a). In 
addition, Clark (1973b) suggests that extermination of the 
entire population of a natural resource may appear as the 
most attractive policy. However, those relations hold when 
capital is absent in the analysis; when capital is required for 
extraction then the influence of the rate of interest on the 
depletion rate is not so clear (Gordon 1966), or at least 
nonmonotonic (Lozada 1993). Nevertheless, some 
environmentalists regard the use of a positive discount rate 
for social choice as misguided and unethical (Jaeger 1995).
 After logging the residual stands still contain so much 
3 -1
timber ranging from 121.1−292.8 m  ha  as shown by 
Saridan and Soegiharto (2012). Meanwhile, for all species, 
3
the growth rate of the residual stand varies, 1.8 m  per ha per 
3 -1 -1
year (Silva et al. 1995), 3.3 m  ha  year  (Wahjono 2007), and 
3 -1 -1
1.7 m  ha  year  (Ayuningtyas 2015). In percentage, the 
growth rate of the residual stand ranges from 0.6−2.7%, or 
1.7% on average. With a different expression, Favrichon et 
al. (2001) shows that the time required for the forest to 
recover and return to the initial state is very long and that a 
felling cycle of 35 years as recommended in TPTI is clearly 
too short.
 In sum, the growth rates of the price and of the resource 
stock add up to -0.1%. Certainly, this figure is not attractive 
for a private enterprise that usually employs a positive 
discount rate or it is much less than the interest rate as an 
opportunity cost for keeping the residual standing stock in 
the field. In general, private entities, which are more market-
oriented, employ a positive and higher discount rate than 
public entities (Cowen 2004, Jagannathan et al. 2016), which 
are less market-oriented, do, so that private entities require a 
higher growth rate of the resource stock than public entities 
do for a given growth rate of the forest product price. This 
requirement leads to a lower resource stock when the natural 
forests are managed by private entities. Furthermore, it is not 
surprising when van Gardingen et al. (2003) found that the 
conventional Indonesian Selective Cutting and Planting 
(TPTI) management system failed to achieve criteria of 
sustainability for timber yield and financial performance. 
Under an extreme situation, no change in price and the 
maximum growth rate of the forest is less than the discount 
rate then extinction is more profitable than continuous 
harvesting (Cropper 1988). Gifford Pinchot, generally 
regarded as the father of American conservation, concluded 
that "The forests which are most profitably used are the 
forests which are best preserved” (Balogh 2002). This 
conclusion does not imply that under commercial utilization 
profitable forests will definitely survive, but certainly 
unprofitable forests will not survive at all; the profitability of 
the forests still needs to be compared to the profitability of 
alternative land use as the opportunity cost.
Property rights A property right regime under which a 
management of renewable natural resources is performed 
determines the performance of the management. In general, 
common-property regime may lead to overexploitation that 
in turn the resource destruction (Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968; 
Clark 1973a; Newbery 1975; Levhari & Mirman 1980; 
Ostrom 1990; Mendelsohn 1994; Ostrom et al. 1999; 
Ferreira 2004; de Oliveira, 2008; Dasgupta 2005). 
Moreover, the easiest solution, if it is possible, in case of 
private goods for instance, is to privatize the resource 
(Hardin 1968; Grafton et al. 2000). What I meant by if it is 
possible is that when the resource addressed is private good. 
However, when the resource at hand is common-pool 
resource, then privatization becomes out of the question. In 
contrast to privatization, in some places the management of 
renewable natural resources under common-property regime 
has been very successful (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999); 
the resource is managed collectively without the tragedy as 
predicted. As a matter of fact, to manage renewable natural 
resources effectively, we need to combine various elements 
of privatization, government control, local control, and 
managerial techniques (Acheson 2006).
 The property right of the forest lands in Indonesia is not 
well-defined or hardly enforced due to the incapacity of the 
government to protect its property. Moreover, Robinson et 
al. (2014) suggest that land tenure security is associated with 
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less deforestation. It is a consequence of the low license fee 
that provides an incentive for the business entities to acquire 
forest as much as possible, even exceeding the capacity of the 
entities to prevent the forest from being extracted by other 
entities who have no permit. In addition, the capacity of the 
government to enforce the law, particularly the one related to 
the property right, is very weak. As a result, the right given to 
the business entities is not ironclad secured, which 
discourages business owners in managing the forest properly. 
However, I believe the relationship is dependent upon who 
obtains the land tenure. If it is given to the indigenous people 
then less deforestation might be very likely; unfortunately, 
the Government Regulation 6 of 2007 article 45 limits the 
amount of timber that can be extracted only up to 50 cubic 
meter by a household a year for non-commercial purposes. 
While, it will not be the case if the land tenure is given to 
private companies seeking for profits; well-defined property 
right is not sufficient for sustainable management (Piazza & 
Roy 2015). Clearly, the indigenous people have been treated 
unjustly by the government.
 In short, the natural forests face a dilemma; when the 
demand for timber rises then the natural forests will be 
exploited excessively due to ill-defined property rights, on 
the contrary when the demand for timber falls then the natural 
forests tend to be converted to other land uses, which are 
more profitable. Above all, the slow growth rates of the 
residual standing stock and the timber price are the culprit of 
the situation, so that a persistent decline of the natural forests 
is unavoidable. In other words, the nonsustainability of the 
natural forest utilization in Indonesia is not a matter of 
probability but rather a certainty. So, the export ban has not 
only failed to promote a sustainable timber industry, but also 
failed to deliver an incentive for the development of 
plantation forest, which would have enabled the government 
to collect a higher revenue.
Result and Discussion
 Naturally, the natural forests have a very low growth rate 
so that a commercial utilization will not be sustainable in the 
long run. Hence, removing policy distortions that disfavor 
forestry over agriculture will not necessarily help to slow 
natural forest conversion as suggested by Hazell (1995). 
Unfortunately, instead of addressing the sustainability 
problem, the government has launched inappropriate and 
unnecessary policies as if the natural forests can be utilized in 
a sustainable manner for timber production purpose. Having 
known that the forest utilization is not sustainable in the long 
term, the government has at least two options, namely the 
mining of natural forest products optimally just like 
nonrenewable resources and/or ask for public's assistance in 
maintaining natural forest utilization. Sadly, the Indonesian 
people in general have not been satisfied with the existing 
policies as well as the condition of the forestry. When natural 
forests were abundant, the abundance benefited a small 
group of people, who was close to the center of power and 
capital. People who live in the abundant forest were only a 
spectator. "Rich forest, poor people" as written by Peluso 
(1992) occurs not only in Java but also elsewhere in 
Indonesia until today.
State forest land establishment The massive exploitation 
of natural forests in Indonesia was begun in 1967 following 
the issuance of Law 5 of 1967 (Basic Forestry Law). This 
Law gave the government a huge power to claim most 
Indonesia's lands as state forest lands (Kawasan Hutan). As a 
result, most forested lands at that time were claimed as state 
forest lands, within which there have been so many 
settlements (kampong) of indigenous people. As a matter of 
fact, the seed of land conflicts has been sown and unfair 
intimidating terminologies have emerged, such as illegal 
settlers, encroachment of state forest land, illegal 
occupation, illegal farming, etc. Even more, the most deadly 
label to whoever disagreed with the government was “a 
member or sympathizer of the Communist Party of 
Indonesia” (PKI). This kind of character assassination was 
commonly practiced in the era of the New Order regime 
running from 1966 to 1998 and has become common 
knowledge in Indonesia. That traumatic experience was one 
side of the Law 5 of 1967. For this reason, in general 
indigenous people hate forestry and its related activities. 
Hence, the public support for the forestry in Indonesia is very 
weak. Replacement of Law 5 of 1967 with Law 41 of 1999 
has not practically changed anything but the concession 
period from 20 years to 55 years. Just recently, in 2016, the 
government launched a social forestry program to address 
issues of inequality in access to forest or land resources 
t h r o u g h  M i n i s t e r i a l  R e g u l a t i o n  N U M B E R  
P.83/MENLHK/SETJEN/KUM.1/10/2016. But the 
licensing scheme is still a major issue, which by many parties 
is predicted to fail because of the difficult requirements that 
participants must meet. The permit will be issued by the 
minister regardless of the size of the forest. This shows that 
the bureaucratic nature of forest governance remains strong.
 This policy is advantageous for large scale private 
business and government officials associated with permit 
issuance and monitoring tasks, but very devastating for the 
indigenous people. Virgin forests have been awarded to 
hundreds of the private businesses that are close to the inner 
circle of political power, in the form of forest utilization 
rights before 1999 and permit for forest product utilization 
since 1999. The process, leading to the issuance of the right 
and the permit, has not been transparent. There is opportunity 
for the government officials to seek private rent. At the same 
time, the indigenous people have been alienated since the 
forests were awarded to the private businesses; they have 
been treated as an enemy of the forestry.  In monitoring, it is a 
common practice that the government officials seek another 
rent instead of finding the violations and rectifying them.
Fees and royalties The Law 41 of 1999 obligates that each 
company that is granted a permit to utilize timber from state 
forest land must pay four types of fee, namely license fee, 
reforestation fund (DR), forest resource provision (PSDH), 
and performance guarantee fund. However, the government 
imposes only the first three without any explanation to the 
public why the government does what it does. Whereas, prior 
to 1999 the government collected the performance guarantee 
fund, which was called the reforestation guarantee fund 
(DJR). The DR is wrongly thought as the continuation of the 
DJR.
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 The license fee is paid once upfront. According to the 
Government Regulation 12 of 2014, the tariffs are 
-1 -1
IDR3,750.00 ha  year  for Sumatera, Sulawesi, and Papua, 
-1 -1
IDR5,000.00 ha  year  for Kalimantan and Maluku Islands, 
-1 -1
IDR2,000.00 ha  year  for Nusa Tenggara. These tariffs are 
considered too low so that they tend to encourage the private 
companies to acquire as big forest land as possible, more 
frequently larger than the size that those companies can 
manage and control effectively. In addition, the government 
does not have enough capacity to enforce the right already 
given to the companies. As a result, the property right is not 
well-defined in this case, which has a serious implication 
when the demand for timber increases.
-3
 In 1980s, the tariff of the DJR was USD4 m . As a 
-3
comparison, the economic rent in 1973−1974 was USD45 m  
(Repetto & Gillis 1988). Assuming that the average harvest 
3 -1 -1
was 50 m  ha , then the DJR generated was USD200 ha  of 
virgin natural forest. The fact that most concession holders 
preferred to leave the DJR money on the hand of the 
government but free from the reforestation responsibility 
indicates that the tariff of the DJR at that time was too low. 
Recently, according to the Government Regulation Number 
12 of 2014, the tariffs of the DR for the most common timber 
-3
range from USD10.5−USD16.5 m , depending on diameter, 
species, and location, whereas the domestic timber prices 
-3
range from USD110−USD150 m .
 Choosing not to execute the performance guarantee fund 
has a serious consequence. The most important risk is that 
this decision sends signal to the public that the value of a 
forest ecosystem is very low. Furthermore, the claim, 
particularly done by the government, that a forest ecosystem 
has high value can easily be challenged. If it is true that a 
forest ecosystem has a high value, then why does the 
government give a right to utilize such a valuable resource to 
private enterprise without any deposit fund? The fact that the 
government does not enforce the law regarding the 
performance guarantee fund could be interpreted that a forest 
ecosystem has a low value. By doing so, in essence, the 
government does not encourage vigilant behavior on the part 
of the private enterprises that get a right to utilize a forest 
ecosystem.
 The private businesses certainly benefit from the existing 
fee and royalty system. The distribution of the forest rent 
between the businesses and the government as the 
representation of the people is not fair. In 2014, the 
government issued the government regulation Number 
12/2014 that introduces a new terminology, i.e. 
compensation for stumpage value. It is an additional charge 
that must be paid by businesses that must clear the existing 
forest in running their business, such as mining companies 
and non-forestry plantation companies; so those companies 
should pay for the compensation for stumpage value in 
addition to PSDH and DR. The regulation shows that the 
government basically recognizes that there is uncaptured 
economic rent in the timber regardless of who harvest the 
timber. This uncaptured rent has been being enjoyed by the 
forest businesses that has rights to harvest timber from the 
natural forests.
Log export ban Export bans were introduced in the 1980s 
and 1990s to increase economic value added in Indonesia, 
and to ensure a timber supply for the local industry. A log 
export ban was introduced in 1985; a rough sawn wood ban 
was introduced in 1992. As a result, production capacity in 
3
the plywood industry rose from 2 million m  yearly in 1980 to 
3
13 million m  yearly in 1995. Today the plywood industry 
consumed 50% of Indonesia's forest output; the other 50% 
was consumed by pulp and paper industry 30% and sawmills 
20%. However, encouraging domestic processing by setting 
low forest levies and restricting trade creates inefficiency and 
does not encourage processors to install equipment which 
will make efficient use of forest resource (Whiteman and 
Scotland, 1999). To make things even worse, the most 
domestic timber processing plants are vertically integrated 
with its sources of the round woods processed. As the result, 
competitive markets of logs cannot emerge.
 The impact or result of inefficient timber processing 
plants will show its clearer face over time; gradually, they 
decline in number due to a shortage in raw material and a lack 
of competitiveness in acquiring the raw material. Most of the 
timber processing plants used to rely on the natural forests 
whose right-to-harvest is usually owned by the same party. 
The transfer price can be set so low so that it is unfairly 
profitable for the processing plant but certainly 
compromising the natural forest. Furthermore, as the 
capacity of the natural forest in producing logs as the raw 
material falls, the management of the processing plant cannot 
compete in acquiring the raw material from free markets.
 Who benefits and who loses due to the log export ban 
policy? This policy only benefits the inefficient wood 
processing industry, while harming the natural forest 
business. In the long run, log production will be no longer 
attractive so the wood processing industry will also 
experience difficulties in obtaining the raw material. In other 
words, as long as the inefficiency of the wood processing 
industry is not improved, this policy will not save natural 
forests and at the same time will hamper the growth of 
plantations.
Certification Can timber and forest certifications in 
Indonesia stop the nonsustainability of the natural forest 
utilization? Although Damette and Delacote (2011) sug gest 
that timber certification seems to have a positive impact on 
harvesting sustainability, my short answer is a big no. 
Simply, the certification itself cannot increase the growth rate 
of standing stock as a fundamental element of the long term 
profitability and hence sustainability. Hence, from this 
perspective, the timber and forest certification is definitely 
not the answer to the nonsustainability. As a matter of fact, 
the certification has been derived from wrong identification 
of the underlying cause of the nonsustainability. The 
empirical data confirm this conclusion.
 There are two types of certification in Indonesia, namely 
voluntary and mandatory. The mandatory certification 
scheme was established in 2009 by the government 
comprising of Sustainable Production Forest Management 
(PHPL) and legal timber verification program (SVLK). 
These certification schemes must be implemented by each 
Forest Utilization Unit (FUU) working in natural as well as 
plantation forests. Until March of 2014, 92 FUUs (10.4 
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million ha) out of 273 units of natural FUU received PHPL 
certification and 21 units received the SVLK certification.
 There are strange phenomena associated with the 
certification, the PHPL as well as the SVLK. The PHPL 
certification did not ensure the sustainability of the forests 
certified. It can be indicated by the fact that many companies 
who have active PHPL certification are not working 
regularly or have already stopped their operation, meaning 
unsustainable. The main reason is that the operation is not 
profitable. In other words, there are problems with the PHPL 
certification system. In addition, the certification does not 
eliminate or even reduce the transaction costs. Unfortunately, 
there is no official data presenting this phenomenon. 
Nurrochmat et al. (2016) conclude that the international 
forest regime, such as SVLK, is not effective for community 
forest.
 In the case of small scale private forest, the certification 
has no use at all. In terms of legality, there is no forest that is 
more legal than private forest. Tree species planted in the 
private forests are different from tree species extracted from 
natural forest; distinguishing them is very easy. A costly 
complicated certification scheme is not needed. It would be 
sufficient if certain several species are automatically 
declared as certified timber because those species are planted 
regularly. Moreover, because the size is small sustainability 
criteria and indicators are not suitable to evaluating the 
sustainability of the private forest. In the meantime, the 
promised premium price has rarely materialized; farmer 
group of Wana Lestari Menoreh in Kulon Progo Regency, 
certified under Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) scheme, 
has obtained the premium price, while farmer group of 
Enggal Mulyo in Ponorogo, certified under FSC scheme, 
-1
obtained the premium price IDR50,000 cubic  meter only for 
Albazia but not for Pine and Mahagony, and finally farmer 
group of Catur Giri Manunggal in Wonogiri Regency, 
certified under Indonesian Ecolabel Institute (LEI) scheme, 
is still waiting for the premium price. The additional revenue 
cannot cover the cost of the certification. Surprisingly, many 
donors and certification bodies under the LEI scheme offer 
certification services.
Forest management unit  Since the private enterprises are 
very unlikely attracted in the long-term business in a natural 
forest, then the only hope is put on the Forest Management 
Unit (KPH in Indonesian). Whereas, the discount rate has an 
implication for intergenerational justice, which is a positive 
discount rate in natural resource management implies that the 
benefits of these natural resources are more reserved for the 
present generation than for the future generations.  Thus, 
who should manage forest resources, private based-entity or 
government-based entity, is essentially a question of political 
economy. A KPH might be willing to employ a very low or 
even zero discount rate, but they do not have capacities to do 
what they are supposed to do. It is a quasi-government body; 
providing public services and running business at the same 
time. Hence, it is not surprising when a big doubt has been 
expressed by many people regarding the effectiveness of 
KPH in the forest utilization. As a comparison, five state-
owned forestry enterprises focusing on running business 
only have failed to sustain profitably. Ruzicka (2010) 
suggests that based on experiences where the forest 
management is done by the state itself, the theoretical 
advantages of the long term management perspective are 
quickly undermined by inefficient management of a 
bureaucracy as commonly found. However, certainly there 
are people who believe that the KPH will be successful. 
Finally, the time will tell which position is correct. Shortly, 
Indonesia's forest management faces a dilemma, which is 
between being more eff icient  but  sacrif icing 
intergenerational justice and less efficient but 
intergenerational justice is not sacrificed.
 So far KPHs have not provided any benefit to the society 
and the businesses. The only party benefiting from the 
existence of the KPHs are their own officials. The 
government has provided office and operational vehicles, but 
most KPHs have produced nothing yet. The future of the 
KPHs is still questionable since there is resistance from some 
of the existing forestry organizations. After a couple of 
months of joining the KPH WhatsApp group, I can grasp the 
uncertainty of the KPH's future raised by most Heads of the 
KPH. Issues often raised are lack of support from the 
government, lack of acceptance from the local government, 
and mismatch between training materials and real problems 
found in the field.
Conclusion
 The natural forests allocated for timber production 
purpose will eventually vanish, mainly because the growth 
rate is too low to support a sustainable profitable business. 
This trend is intensified by ill-defined property right that to 
some degree is promoted by the government policy, such as 
the license fee that is set too low. The DJR that has been set 
too low would not create an incentive for the companies to 
conduct reforestation on their working areas. Instead of 
easing the situation, the government policies put additional 
burdens on the businesses, such as log export ban strongly 
distorting the log prices, inefficient revenue system 
especially reforestation guarantee fund leads to irresponsible 
behavior on the part of the companies, and timber and forest 
certification raising the production costs without generating 
sufficient additional revenue to the companies. In short, the 
forestry political economy of Indonesia has failed to deliver 
the promised outcome, even has failed to recognize the most 
fundamental issues.
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